La tribu de los nativos del poblado de Ses Paysses reacciona con odio y violencia ante la presencia de los extraños griegos. Nuredduna descubre en la finura de espíritu del rapsoda Melesigeno que existe un nuevo mundo que enriquece su condición humana. La gran estatua de Nuredduna, de Remigia Caubet, en el Paseo Marítimo de Palma, muestra a Nuredduna mirando al mar con la mano extendida como esperando la llegada del extranjero que la abrirá a un nuevo mundo de harmonía, (...) más universal, mucho más enriquecedor que la mirada corta que se cree dueña de lo inmediato. Este precioso mensaje del poema de Miquel Costa i Llobera tiene una evidente actualidad para Mallorca, para España, para Europa y para el mundo. Todos se ven atormentados por los nacionalismos, por las fuertes corrientes migratorias e inmigratorias, por el turismo, y, al mismo tiempo, estimulados por la llamada filosófica del hombre universal de Hegel y por la llamada cristiana a la hermandad universal. El poema de Costa es una hermosa y poética llamada a saber dejarnos llevar por la dinámica de la historia que nos mueve a superar la singularidad y abrirnos a la universalidad. (shrink)

En contra de les aparences, la meva intenció és ridiculitzar i desactivar l’estratègic ús de referències a personatges de ficció per part dels mass media, els quals pretenen identificar el fundador de WikiLeaks amb tot aquest projecte —quelcom que facilita tant la deslegitimació com la mercantilització. Així, aquest article qüestiona la dominant personalització de la web de filtracions en Julian Assange, tot mostrant algunes de les més rellevants diferències i/o contradiccions entre el rerefons normatiu de WikiLeaks i la pseudo-filosofia política (...) de l’australià. La meva tesi és que la justificació de la il·legal revelació d’informació secreta i confidencial com a pràctica de desobediència civil es posa en perill per la contaminació de postulats utilitaristes i neoliberals. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 32, Issue S2, Page 65-67, September 2023.

Des présocratiques à Plotin en passant par Socrate, Platon, Aristote, Epicure et les stoïciens, Jean-François Mattéi nous convie à un voyage initiatique dans la philosophie antique. C'est à cette source que la raison occidentale se nourrit depuis des siècles. On y assiste à la naissance de la philosophie, de la physique, des mathématiques, de la politique : éblouissant feu d'artifice de la pensée comme l'histoire en a peu connu depuis lors, et qui continue de résonner dans les débats d'aujourd'hui. En (...) fin pédagogue, Jean-François Mattéi construit des ponts entre hier et maintenant, fidèle à la formule qui fait le succès de la série "Une histoire personnelle de...". (shrink)

Este artículo transmite dos ideas destacadas: por un lado, defiende la justicia y la verdad de la democracia deliberativa; por el otro, denuncia el carácter ficticio del paradigma «westfaliano». Las dos hipótesis aparecen gracias a las filtraciones éticas de WikiLeaks. De cara a evaluarlas, previamente examino de forma crítica la evolución de la concepción política de Jürgen Habermas. Mi aportación es reinterpretar su deliberacionismo como una combinación entre una teoría del poder y una de la opinión pública.

Nietzsche dénonçait en 1887 les excitants qui ravageaient son temps : erotica, socialistica, pathologica. On y reconnaîtra les trois métaphores d'une même tendance à la régression : barbarica. La Barbarie éternelle, c'est l'informe, le matériau brut, la désolation qui crie la victoire du désert. Les Anciens avaient rejeté le Barbare aux confins de la civilisation ; les Modernes ont choisi une stratégie plus subtile : pour la dissoudre, la Raison a intégré la Barbarie au fond d'elle-même. En se coupant de (...) la transcendance du sens, le Sujet contemporain a engendré les formes de fragmentation psychologique et sociale les plus aberrantes. Les effets de barbarie se manifestent par la dissolution de l'homme, l'effondrement de l'éducation, la destruction de la culture et l'abolition du politique. Cette barbarie intérieure signe la faillite de l'universel dans l'avènement de l'immonde moderne. Et s'" il n'y a plus de déserts ", comme le regrettait Camus, c'est que le désert a délaissé les horizons lointains pour assécher la civilisation en ce qu'elle a de plus proche. Le désert est aujourd'hui au cœur de la cité parce que la barbarie est au cœur de la civilisation. (shrink)

Le vingtième siècle aura été le siècle de la démesure. La démesure de la politique avec des guerres mondiales, des déportations et des camps d'extermination, qui a culminé avec deux bombes atomiques larguées sur des populations civiles. La démesure de l'homme, ensuite, puisque ces crimes ont été commis au nom d'idéologies abstraites qui, pour sauver l'humanité, ont sacrifié sans remords les hommes réels. La démesure du monde, enfin, avec une science prométhéenne qui a tenté de percer les secrets de l'univers, (...) une technique déchaînée qui a cherché à asservir la nature et une économie mondialisée dont les échanges ont imposé le prix des choses au détriment de la dignité des hommes. Nietzsche avait clairement établi le diagnostic : "La mesure nous est étrangère, reconnaissons-le; notre démangeaison, c'est justement la démangeaison de l'infini, de l'immense. " Le sens de la démesure semble être une fatalité, aussi n'est-il pas étonnant que, déjà chez les Grecs, dans le mythe, la tragédie, la physique, l'éthique ou la politique, il se situe au coeur de la réflexion. Au travers de la tentation de la raison d'abolir toute limite, de remettre en cause la finitude humaine, la démesure témoigne du tragique de notre condition. Les Grecs, et c'est l'enseignement de ce livre, se sont attachés à la comprendre pour la convertir en cette mesure qui permet de redonner un sens à notre existence. (shrink)

In this article I am concerned with whether it could be morally significant to distinguish between doing something 'in order to bring about an effect' as opposed to 'doing something because we will bring about an effect'. For example, the Doctrine of Double Effect tells us that we should not act in order to bring about evil, but even if this is true is it perhaps permissible to act only because an evil will thus occur? I discuss these questions in (...) connection with a version of the so-called Trolley Problem known as the Loop Case. I also consider how these questions may bear on whether a rational agent must aim at an event which he believes is causally necessary to achieve an end he pursues. (shrink)

La genealogia de la moral de Nietzsche, resulta extremadament pertinent per una epistemologia del bé relativa a les incisions institucionals sobre part de la població del Raval. Primer, sobre Raval s�haurien dut a terme tot tipus d�abusos, com destruccions d�habitatges i de trama urbana, així com persecucions o expulsions de població, pel bé del barri o de la ciutat. Si això és així, es pot afirmar que les convergències institucionals en aquest punt es sustenten en una epistemologia interessada. Segon, el (...) pathos de la distància definit per Nietzsche, així com l�assumpció per part de les noves ideologies urbanístiques del primitiu paper de la �casta sacerdotal�, permetrien actualitzar la crítica envers �el civisme�, entès aquest, com l�expressió més recent i efectiva de les cultures de control. I tercer, aquesta epistemologia interessada, permetria reclamar la noció marxiana de lluita de classes per interpretar un crònic i generalitzat menyspreu sobre una part important de la població més irredempta d�un dels barris més convulsos d�Europa. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v34-ruiz-domenec.

One conventional view of businesses is to reduce them to mere performers of economic transactions in an exercise of exchange based on the “logic of self‐interest,” and under the criterion do ut des, meaning “I give in order that you may give.” Drawing from personalist philosophy, this article argues that financial and organizational interactions are encounters, relations between persons, not mere economic transactions. Furthermore, people involved in business have the capacity to establish relations of gratuity with others under the criterion (...) do propter alterum, that is, “give to the other as another,” without expecting a return. This criterion is at the core of the “logic of gift.” We argue that giving authentic gifts is intrinsically good, since it contributes to the human flourishing of those who practice this behavior. Implementing the “logic of gift” is also beneficial for the company because it contributes to humanizing the company. In addition, applying the logic of gift will probably bring about trust and social cohesion between people, with positive consequences for business performance, which is consistent with previous findings. (shrink)

La genealogia de la moral de Nietzsche, resulta extremadament pertinent per una epistemologia del bé relativa a les incisions institucionals sobre part de la població del Raval. Primer, sobre Raval s’haurien dut a terme tot tipus d’abusos, com destruccions d’habitatges i de trama urbana, així com persecucions o expulsions de població, pel bé del barri o de la ciutat. Si això és així, es pot afirmar que les convergències institucionals en aquest punt es sustenten en una epistemologia interessada. Segon, el (...) pathos de la distància definit per Nietzsche, així com l’assumpció per part de les noves ideologies urbanístiques del primitiu paper de la “casta sacerdotal”, permetrien actualitzar la crítica envers “el civisme”, entès aquest, com l’expressió més recent i efectiva de les cultures de control. I tercer, aquesta epistemologia interessada, permetria reclamar la noció marxiana de lluita de classes per interpretar un crònic i generalitzat menyspreu sobre una part important de la població més irredempta d’un dels barris més convulsos d’Europa. (shrink)

Nous vivons une période étrange, probablement même périlleuse à bien des égards. Les avancées de la science, de la médecine et des technologies sont telles qu'elles posent désormais la question de l'avenir de notre commune humanité. Mon corps est-il ma personne ou est-il une chose? S'agit-il simplement d'un ensemble de pièces que l'on peut remplacer, ou d'une enveloppe que l'on pourrait changer? Notre destin est-il, tout entier, inscrit dans nos gènes? Avec le développement des techniques de procréation médicalement assistée, l'enfant (...) demeure-t-il un sujet de droit ou devient-il un objet auquel on aurait droit? L'aventure humaine est-elle réellement menacée par le posthumanisme? Que penser enfin des promesses d'un homme manipulé et amélioré par le transhumanisme, grâce aux nanotechnologies, aux biotechnologies, à l'informatique et aux sciences cognitives... Jean-François Mattei nous propose un retour à une culture du doute, nécessaire pour armer notre pensée face aux défis à venir. Nous invitant à une réflexion éthique, philosophique et politique, il nous amène à nous demander si, modifiant notre humanité, nous pourrions néanmoins rester humains... (shrink)

The present paper examines the relationship between explicit and implicit memory and ultimate attainment in the native language. Two groups of native speakers of English with different levels of academic attainment (i.e., high vs. low) took part in three language tasks which assessed grammar, vocabulary and collocational knowledge, as well as phonological short-term memory (assessed using a forward digit-span task), explicit associative memory (assessed using a paired-associates task) and implicit memory (assessed using a deterministic serial reaction time task). Results revealed (...) strong relationships between phonological short-term memory and explicit associative memory on the one hand and the three language tasks on the other hand, and no relation between linguistic performance and implicit memory. Taken together, these results cast doubts on the common assumption that L1 grammar learning depends almost entirely on implicit memory and align with the claims of usage-based models of language acquisition that grammatical and lexical knowledge depend on the same cognitive mechanisms. (shrink)

Exposición correspondiente al acto de defensa de la Tesis Doctoral del Dr. Bordas Prószynski, intitulada El pensamiento político de Josep Torras i Bages, en la que se recorre el marco histórico-cultural de la Cataluña de finales del siglo xix y de comienzos del xx, para apreciar la aportación de la persona y de la obra de Josep Torras i Bages, obispo de Vic durante los años 1899 a 1916. El resultado de la investigación ofrece una síntesis de su pensamiento político, (...) especialmente por lo que se refiere a su doctrina regionalista, vindicando la tradición cristiana de Cataluña. (shrink)

Loyalty within the firm, though praised by some, is criticized by others. An analysis of the historical and current significance of theconcept of loyalty can aid in both understanding its critics and responding to them. Loyalty in the business world is generallyunderstood in three ways: i) transactional retention, ii) sentimental attraction, and iii) willingness to commit oneself. In the third type,the commitment to adhere to a person, cause, or institution may contribute to human flourishing and therefore generate the humanvirtue of (...) loyalty. The human virtue of loyalty is as far from fanaticism as it is from the betrayal of legitimate commitments freely undertaken. As with all virtues, its content must be rationally determined. Loyalty thus understood enhances the humanity of both persons and business firms and contributes to heightened cohesion and cooperation within the firm. Moreover, according to some recent research, managing a business on the basis of loyalty can enhance economic results. (shrink)

Rationality at the Limits and the Limits of Rationality:The Question of the Integrity and Existence of the Human SpeciesThe purpose of this article is to address the question of our responsibility as human beings, by taking into consideration the intersection between ethics and science. I intend to prove that the issues raised by the existence and the integrity of the human species is a new and curious form of power founded on what I call “the principle of non-reciprocity” that unites (...) the humanity of today with the future generations. The question that I address is the following: how to act on the future of humanity so that this action can not be regarded as unfair? (shrink)

El propósito del artículo es dar cuenta de ciertas peculiaridades de la controversia predestinataria queprotagonizaron, en el siglo IX, Godescalco y sus seguidores, por un lado, y Rabano Mauro e Hincmarode Reims como sus máximos oponentes. En particular nos parece de interés advertir que las diversas interpretacionesacerca de la predestinación divina tuvieron un modo distinto de aproximación por parte delas dos facciones, algo que tendría un origen, a nuestro parecer, en las antagónicas geografías espiritualesen las que se produjeron dichas especulaciones, (...) y ello pudo estar también en la base de la mutua incomprensiónentre quienes defendían posiciones doctrinales que, a la postre —algo que se entiende probarasimismo en el artículo— no estaban tan distanciadas entre sí como podría hacer sospechar elencarnizamiento con que se produjo la polémica.The aim of this paper is to clarify certain details of the predestinarian controversy that took place inFrance in the ninth century, between Gottschalck and his followers, on one side, and their opponents RabanMaur and Hincmar of Reims on the other. We consider it interesting to point out that their interpretationsconcerning divine predestination had their origins in different places in France, and we can refer, in thissense, to distinct spiritual geographies in their opposed approaches to God’s foreknowledge of futureevents. We will also try to prove that the two proposals concerning the nature of predestination were not so conflicting as the intensity of the controversy seems to reflect. (shrink)

Morality, Mortality as a whole deals with certain aspects of ethical theory and with moral problems that arise primarily in contexts involving life‐and‐death decisions. The importance of the theoretical issues is not limited to their relevance to these decisions; however, they are, rather, issues at the heart of basic moral and political theory. This first volume comprises three parts. Part I, Death: From Bad to Worse, has with four chapters, and an appendix, discussing death and why it is bad for (...) the person who dies. Part II, Saving Lives: General Issues, has six chapters, and explores a cluster of moral problems that arise in saving lives. The general question raised is whether we should always, in aiding life, act so as to save the greater number of lives or to produce the greatest amount of good. Part III, Scarce Resources: Theoretical Issues, Specific Recommendations, and Organ Transplants, has five chapters, and deals with the problem of the acquisition and distribution of organs for transplantation. It allows us to apply the theoretical discussion of saving lives and relevant/irrelevant utilities presented in the previous parts. However, the discussion can be understood independently of the first two parts, and the conceptual issues and procedures on which it focuses are relevant to dealing with any scarce resource, including money and time, which are needed to use other plentiful resources. Although the book contains much theoretical and methodological argument, it is firmly grounded in practical ethical issues, and is illustrated throughout by examples. (shrink)

The notion of implicature has been a matter of discussion since Grice put it forward. He proposed a schema to explain how implicatures are generated and inferred, but the key condition it contains has been surprisingly overlooked. Davis detected it and named it determinacy, though for him this requirement raises several problems that make the whole Gricean theory of implicature untenable. I claim that, although the determinacy condition is flawed, it still captures a crucial mechanism of how implicatures are interpreted. (...) I attempt to recover this requirement under the relevance theory approach and show that, unlike the determinacy condition, the strength condition does not face the problems Davis formulates. Keywords: implicature, determinacy, strength, Cooperative Principle, principle of relevance, Gricean theory, relevance theory. (shrink)

From 1957 to 1973, Barcelona Zoo was transformed from a small-scale, antiquated establishment harboring very few animals, a place that was still in a poor condition following the Spanish Civil War, into a new, larger, modern, and internationally recognized institution that included up-to-date animal enclosures and that boasted one of the first dolphinariums in Europe, as well as a famous white gorilla as its icon. From its very beginning, this renovation involved an intense popularization campaign. In this paper, by describing (...) the public discourse generated throughout this transformation and by analyzing the roles played by Antoni Jonch, the director of the zoo at that time; Josep Maria de Porcioles, the then-mayor of Barcelona; and General Francisco Franco, the Spanish dictator who was head of state during this period, I will highlight how the context of the dictatorship not only authorized the new Barcelona Zoo but is, in fact, crucial to its understanding. The narratives that surrounded the renovation of the zoo focused on its civic and educational purpose, with a firm emphasis on modernity. The zoo was a modern space for learning about animals in order to become better people. These narratives were not only suitable to the policies, ideas, and aims of Porcioles’ City Council and Franco’s dictatorial regime; in fact, they completely matched them. Both local and national governments benefited from the restructuring of Barcelona Zoo and from its public discourse as a tool for social control and an instrument for their own propaganda, legitimation, and perpetuation. (shrink)

In May 1965, in the midst of Franco's dictatorship in Spain, four bottlenose dolphins travelled from Miami to Barcelona Zoo. These became the inhabitants of one of the first dolphinariums in Europe. The arrival of the dolphins was preceded by two trips of the zoo's director, accompanied by an architect and a politician, to visit the installations at the Miami Seaquarium, Sea World San Diego, and Marineland of the Pacific in California. In this paper, I reflect on how knowledge and (...) practices about a completely new animal and its keeping were acquired in the Barcelona Zoo. This was a time when exhibitions, popular perception, and scientific research regarding marine mammals were being developed. The training and exhibition of dolphins was shaped by a mixture of circus-like practices and scientific knowledge. Dolphins arrived in Europe with “knowledges” and practices attached, but also with a lot of uncertainty. However, circumstances like geography, logistics, and the corporate character of American aquaria prevented a straightforward flow of information from the United States to Europe. How did Barcelona Zoo keepers manage to gather information on the building and maintenance of a dolphinarium? And how did they gather information on how to feed, care, train, and exhibit the dolphins? This paper seeks to understand how the particular setting of Barcelona Zoo, as well as its social, scientific, and political context shaped the exhibition of and creation of knowledge about animals at the zoo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 33-36 [Access article in PDF] How I, a Christian, Have Learned from Buddhist Practice, or "The Frog Sat on the Lily Pad... Not Waiting" Frances S. Adeney Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary As a Christian, I have practiced various forms of silent meditation. I remember sitting under the grand piano as a child of three, watching the sun flit through white curtains during our one-hour home (...) communion service of the Plymouth Brethren. Most of the hour was spent in communal silence, gathered around a small table upon which was placed wine and bread. My memories of these meetings are filled with a sense of awe and presence.I practiced a different kind of silent meditation as a young adult when I spent six weeks living on a beach in Greece. I saw few people apart from my two companions and the shepherdess who brought her flock to the meadow each day. I spent hours watching the waves or studying the grains of sand at my feet. I never missed a sunset.At certain times of my life, there were more intentional, prayer-filled kinds of silent meditation. Wordless yearnings and grievings were brought to those meditations as I sought understanding and peace during times of illness, loss, and confusion. I wouldn't call any of those experiences Buddhist meditation. They were intentionally focused on either worshiping Christ or experiencing nature. There was no attempt to leave behind desires, no longing for emptiness, no intentional focus on being in the present moment, qualities that I associate with Buddhist meditation.The first time I joined a group of people practicing Buddhist sitting was in 1997. Yet I felt like I had been doing this kind of silent meditating for years. Here is how that convergence came about.During the early 1990s, while living in Indonesia, I frequently visited a Trappist monastery in central Java. The nuns there didn't practice Buddhism, but my spiritual director, a German priest who lived down the mountain, said to me, "Come and see." Father Hamma introduced me to sitting in a gentle non-technique-oriented way. He called it "contemplative prayer." I took up this practice daily during a difficult time of loss in my life. Spiritual retreats at the monastery up the mountain helped me learn to let go of what I could not hold onto in life. It was there that I began to experience the delight and calm that comes from a practice of meditative silence. [End Page 33]This silent meditation differed from other practices of silence that I had known in significant ways: (1) It was not focused on an interchange between God and myself. I was not listening for God's voice. I was not bringing my concerns to God. I was simply entering a place of silence. (2) It was not predicated on specific ideas about God or thoughts from writings in the Bible. I did not need to frame this time of silence with religious meanings. (3) It was not focused on an outcome. I neither expected nor did I ask for any changes in myself or the world.Yet there were ways in which this practice of meditative silence was framed by my Christian faith. In taking up this practice, I felt I was intentionally entering God's presence. While not looking for spiritual experiences, I was somehow seeking life, and I did believe that God met me in those silent moments. More than once I had experiences that were "sightings" if not meetings with the Divine. During the seven years that I have practiced entering silence, the space that I enter has grown larger, and the conviction that I am entering and becoming part of God's presence deepens. The frog sat on the lily pad not waiting. This Haiku poem resulted from one such experience. I had taken the bus out from the city. It dropped me at the foot of one of hundreds of small mountains in Java covered by... (shrink)

El silencio como alabanza a Dios se halla, en la teología de Maimónides, imbricado con sus consideraciones en torno a la naturaleza de la esencia de Aquél, que se revelará como absolutamente incognoscible. En Guía I Maimónides destaca que el conocimiento divino y el humano no tienen nada de común entre sí, pero aun siendo así podemos orientar nuestro intelecto hacia la consideración de Su naturaleza a través de la ‘expresión aproximativa’ , si bien ello no nos permitirá alcanzar a (...) entender Su esencia. Según el de Córdoba, alabamos a Dios a través del silencio, aunque expresamos también nuestro acercamiento a él mediante los atributos de acción y por la vía de la negación de cualquier atributo que pudiera asociarse a Su naturaleza. (shrink)

Silence as praise to God is directly linked in Maimonides’ theology to some asserts concerning divine nature which makes Him absolutely unknowable. In Guide I (chapters 50 to 60) Maimonides considers that divine and human knowledge and nature have nothing in common, but even so we can direct our mind towards God through ‘looseness of expression’ (tasāmuh), a device which, nevertheless, doesn’t allow us to grasp His essence. According to Maimonides, we worship God through silence even if we can express (...) our attempt to approach him through attributes of action and the negation of any attribute that could express an essence. (shrink)

In The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche argued that only a form of philosophizing that sprung from a deep commitment to the subject could ever hope for success. ‘All great problems,’ he wrote, ‘demand great love.’ He continued: It makes the most telling difference whether a thinker has a personal relationship to his problems and finds in them his destiny, his distress, and his greatest happiness, or an ‘impersonal’ one, meaning he is only able to touch them with the antennae of (...) cold, curious thought. In the latter case nothing will come of it, that much can be promised; for even if great problems should let themselves be grasped by them, they would not allow frogs and weaklings to hold on to them. Nietzsche went on to complain that, to his knowledge, no one had yet approached moral philosophy in this way: Why, then, have I never yet encountered anyone, not even in books, who approached morality in this personal way and who knew morality as a problem, and this problem as his own personal distress, torment, voluptuousness, and passion? Alex Voorhoeve run01.tex V1 - 07/29/2009 7:23am Page 16.. (shrink)

v. 1. A-C -- v. 2. D-F -- v. 3. G-N -- v. 4. O-R -- v. 5. S-Z i apéndix.

One of Moore’s paradoxical sentence types is ‘P, but I believe ~P’. Mooreans have assumed that all tokens of that sentence type are absurd in some way: epistemically, pragmatically, semantically, or assertively. And then they proceed to debate what the absurdity really is. I argue that if one has the appropriate philosophical views, then one can rationally assert tokens of that sentence type, and one can be epistemically reasonable in the corresponding compound belief as well.

Introduction: representationalismMost theorists of cognition endorse some version of representationalism, which I will understand as the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities. Of course, notions such as ‘representation’ and ‘information-using’ are terms of art that require explication. As a first pass, representations are “mediating states of an intelligent system that carry information” (Markman and Dietrich 2001, p. 471). They have two important features: (1) they are physically realized, and so (...) have causal powers; (2) they are intentional, in other words, they have meaning or representational content. This presumes a distinction between a representational vehicle—a physical state or structure that has causal powers and is responsible for producing behavior—and its content. Consider the following characterization of a device that computes the addition functionReaders will recognize the similarity t. (shrink)

Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant to the disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade. I argue that although in some cases the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in which the situation arises the renegade is (...) blameworthy in her disagreement with recognized epistemic superiors. I also offer some thoughts on what it would mean for philosophical practice for us to refrain from being renegades. Finally, I show how a new kind of radical skepticism emerges from modest theses regarding the renegade. (shrink)